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THE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE
OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS: BLURRED LINES
GREG EDDINGTON *
Oklahoma is one of only two states—the other being Texas—with two
courts of last resort: one with civil appellate jurisdiction and the other
criminal. The original Oklahoma Constitution provided an option for the
legislature to create a criminal court of appeals, 1 and the legislature did so
the next year. 2 After an initial period sorting out the types of cases that fell
on each side of the boundary, the two courts existed relatively free from
jurisdictional conflict throughout the first hundred years of their
coexistence. In fact, in 1978, the Oklahoma Supreme Court wrote that
[i]t speaks well of our bifurcated civil-criminal appellate system
that there has not been a jurisdictional conflict between this
Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals for more than fifty
years. This scarcity of conflict is a testament to both the clarity
of jurisdictional boundaries between the two Courts and the
constant willingness of the members of each Court to observe
and comply with their jurisdictional restrictions.3
In the last five years, this spirit of comity appears to have deteriorated.
The supreme court has addressed the jurisdictional boundary several times
in reported opinions, usually followed by a rebuttal from the court of
criminal appeals. The most well-known case, Lockett v. Evans, 4 nearly
provoked a constitutional crisis in 2014 when the supreme court issued a
stay of a prisoner’s execution, 5 and the governor issued an executive order
declining to “give effect” to the stay. 6 A jurisdictional conflict arose again
in 2016, 7 with one court of criminal appeals judge suggesting that the
* Director of Legal Research and Writing, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
1. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 2 (amended 1967).
2. 1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 291.
3. Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 1978 OK 130, ¶ 1, 595 P.2d 416, 417-18
(footnote omitted).
4. (Lockett IV), 2014 OK 34, 330 P.3d 488 (per curiam).
5. Lockett v. Evans (Lockett III), 2014 OK 33, 356 P.3d 58 (per curiam) (mem.).
6. 31 Okla. Reg. 618 (Apr. 22, 2014).
7. Meyer v. Smith, 2015 OK 86, 366 P.3d 311; Meyer v. Engle, 2016 OK CR 1, 369
P.3d 37.
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legislature might need to intervene and “reaffirm this Court’s exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters.”8
Much has been written in critique of subject-matter judicial
specialization. 9 This article addresses only one of the common criticisms as
it applies to the Oklahoma system: boundary problems. This article reviews
the history of the jurisdictional boundary drawing in Oklahoma, with
particular attention given to the principles advanced by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to support its occasional incursions into what appear at first
blush to have been criminal cases. The article then analyzes the recent
conflicts, particularly the one in Lockett, examining the positions of both
courts in light of that history. Finally, the article concludes with
comparisons to analogous issues in Texas and recommendations for
resolution of the current state of jurisdictional bickering.
I. The Creation of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
The Oklahoma Constitution was adopted in 1907. It created a supreme
court, district courts, and other inferior courts such as county courts and
municipal courts. 10 Initially, the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court
extended to all civil and criminal cases.11 But the original constitution
granted the supreme court criminal appellate jurisdiction only “until a
Criminal Court of Appeals with exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal
cases shall be established by law.” 12 The constitution also provided that the
supreme court’s original jurisdiction extended “to a general superintending
control over all inferior courts and all commissions and boards created by
law.” 13 Finally, the supreme court was authorized to issue writs.14
The history of the constitution does not indicate why its framers chose to
include the option of bifurcated appellate jurisdiction. Presumably, they
were undecided about whether to follow the Texas model—two coequal
8. Engle, ¶ 3, 369 P.3d at 42 (Lewis, J., specially concurring).
9. See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Jurisdiction, 100
GEORGETOWN L.J. 1437 (2012); Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of
Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847 (2012); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of
Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial
Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761 (1983).
10. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (amended 1967).
11. Id. art. 7, § 2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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highest courts—or the model of the other forty-five states that had one
supreme court with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. In any event, the
legislature quickly created a criminal court of appeals in 1908, with
“exclusive appellate jurisdiction . . . in all criminal cases appealed from”
other courts. 15 The court also had the power to issue writs of habeas corpus
and “writs as may be necessary to exercise its jurisdiction.” 16 In 1959, the
court was renamed the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (COCA) and
still bears that name. 17
The available legislative history of the enactment consists solely of a
message from the governor urging passage. 18 The message noted that the
supreme court was “completely snowed under” and that “the speedy trial
and termination of criminal cases and the establishing of precedents by a
court of last resort for the guidance of local courts . . . is not only a
desirable thing but the cheapest way to conduct the criminal prosecutions of
the State.” 19 The governor calculated that the cost of keeping two or three
prisoners per county awaiting trial for the long period then existing would
amount to more than the cost of a court of criminal appeals. 20
The statute originally provided that COCA had exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over criminal cases, unless the construction of the Oklahoma
Constitution, the Constitution of the United States, or an act of Congress
was in question, in which the case the court was to certify the question to
the Oklahoma Supreme Court and await its decision. 21 The statute was
amended in 1909 to eliminate that limitation, leaving COCA with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. 22
In 1967, the Oklahoma Constitution was amended. The amended
constitution now vests jurisdiction in COCA, recognizing its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, but with a proviso that the
jurisdiction of the court is subject to the power of the legislature to alter. 23
The amendment also gave COCA the power to issue writs in “criminal

15.
16.
17.
18.
1908).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011).
Id. § 41.
Id. § 31.1.
Message from the Governor, H. Journal, 1st Leg. 350, 357-58 (Okla., Mar. 30,
Id. at 357.
Id.
1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 291.
1909 Okla. Sess. Laws 171-72.
OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (amended 1967).
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matters.” 24 Most importantly, the amended constitution explicitly provides
that in the event of conflict between the two courts regarding jurisdiction,
“the Supreme Court shall determine which court has jurisdiction and such
determination shall be final.” 25 The amended version made no change to the
supreme court’s general superintending power or power to issue writs.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court and courts of other states whose
constitutions contain similar language consider that language as creating
three types of jurisdiction: appellate, superintending control, and writ. 26
Appellate jurisdiction is used to decide appeals from final orders or certain
interlocutory orders. 27 Superintending-control jurisdiction is used to control
the course of litigation in inferior courts,28 and as discussed below, has been
used more broadly. Writ jurisdiction may be used to issue common-law
writs in multiple circumstances, including circumstances outside
superintending control of other courts, 29 but Oklahoma and other states
have noted that the two types of jurisdiction, “while separate and distinct,
are closely related,” and “[i]t is not always easy or necessary to note the
line of demarcation between the two.” 30 In practice, the difference between
the two types of jurisdiction is that superintending-control jurisdiction is
broader: although it is usually exercised via writ, superintending-control
jurisdiction allows for remedies other than writs, for example, declaratory
relief. 31
24. Id. art. 7, § 4.
25. Id.
26. E.g., State ex rel. Fourth Nat’l Bank of Phila. v. Johnson, 79 N.W. 1081, 1086 (Wis.
1899). The Oklahoma Supreme Court actually considers itself to have five types of
jurisdiction, adding jurisdiction to determine whether it or COCA has jurisdiction in a
particular case, and “further jurisdiction [as may be] conferred by statute.” Cline v. Okla.
Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 2013 OK 93, ¶ 6, 313 P.3d 253, 256 (citing OKLA. CONST. art. 7, §
4).
27. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 952 (2011).
28. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 79 N.W. at 1087.
29. See Ethics Comm’n v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, ¶ 8, 850 P.2d 1069, 1085 (“Writs . . .
are mere remedial devices for redressing a variety of governmental usurpation and private
abuse of power . . . .”) (Opala, J., concurring in result).
30. Bd. of Comm'rs of Harmon Cty. v. Keen, 1994 OK 243, ¶ 5, 153 P.2d 483, 485
(invoking superintending control to issue writ prohibiting trial judge from proceeding with
case); see, e.g., Petition of Heil, 284 N.W. 42, 46 (Wis. 1938).
31. See, e.g., Cullison, ¶ 37, 850 P.2d at 1080 (issuing declaratory relief regarding the
constitutionality of a statute). The distinction between writ jurisdiction and superintendingcontrol jurisdiction is not particularly helpful. For example, in Dutton v. City of Midwest
City, 2015 OK 51, ¶¶ 22-26, 353 P.3d 532, 542-45, the court attempted to explain the
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Regarding superintending control (the 1967 amendment changed the
term to “superintendent”), 32 the framers of the Oklahoma Constitution
presumably adopted this language from that of numerous other state
constitutions with similar provisions, which those states had adopted from
the model of King’s Bench in England. 33 Blackstone had characterized this
power as “high and transcendent,” and as “keep[ing] all inferior
jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority.” 34 Other states had
considered the power “as broad as the exigencies of the case demand.” 35
The Oklahoma Constitution grants the supreme court this power over “all
inferior courts” as well as agencies, boards, and commissions.36
In older, pre-constitutional amendment opinions, the supreme court
specifically classified COCA as an “inferior” court subject to
superintending control. 37 The supreme court based this analysis on COCA’s
absence from the original constitution, along with the constitution’s
provision that other courts “inferior to the Supreme Court . . . may be
established by law.” 38 Because COCA’s existence depended on its being
established by the legislature, the supreme court found it clearly within the
definition of an “inferior” court, subject to superintending control. 39 As
distinction, giving examples of both types. One case, State v. Lynch, 1990 OK 82, 796 P.2d
1150, was listed as an example for each type of jurisdiction, indicating that the two are not
distinct types of jurisdiction at all. Cf. Cullison, ¶¶ 2-3, 850 P.2d at 1081, 1083 (Opala, J.
concurring) (listing three categories: “(1) appellate jurisdiction, (2) original jurisdiction and
(3) superintending control,” and reasoning that “[p]rerogative writs do not translate into
jurisdiction; they rather afford examples of personal commands that may be used in the
exercise of this court’s cognizance.” (emphasis omitted))
32. See OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4.
33. See JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT 28 (2009); see also State ex rel.
Freeling v. Kight, 1915 OK 772, ¶¶ 3-11, 152 P. 362, 363-64; Fourth Nat’l Bank, 79 N.W. at
1087.
34. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *42; see also 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 212 (A. L. Goodhart & H. G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1971)
(describing King’s Bench jurisdiction as “general and universal” and including “jurisdiction
‘to examine and correct all and all manner of errors in fact and in law of all the judges and
justices of the realm in their judgments, process, and proceedings’” (quoting EDWARD COKE,
THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 (1644)).
35. Kight, ¶ 15, 152 P. at 364 (citing State ex rel. Bayha v. Kan. City Court of Appeals,
10 S.W. 855 (Mo. 1889); State ex rel. Whitesite v. Dist. Court of First Judicial Dist., 63 P.
395 (Mont. 1900)).
36. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4.
37. Dancy v. Owens, 1927 OK 203, ¶ 10, 258 P. 879, 881.
38. Id. ¶ 9, 258 P. at 881 (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (amended 1967)).
39. Id. ¶ 14, 258 P. at 882.
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noted above, the 1967 amendment gave COCA constitutional recognition
and added the provision for the supreme court to resolve jurisdictional
conflicts. But the “superintending control” language was not changed in
any significant way, and the sparse history of the amendment indicates no
intent to clarify or change the relationship of the two courts, except for the
conflict-resolving provision. 40 Accordingly, the supreme court continued to
cite with approval its pre-1967 analysis of the relationship. 41
Although the supreme court’s appellate jurisdiction is explicitly limited
to civil cases, the constitution does not explicitly limit superintendingcontrol jurisdiction to civil cases. Taken in isolation, therefore, the supreme
court would seem to be able to exercise its broad, King’s Bench-like control
over COCA as a court inferior to the supreme court. It is easy to see,
though, that such a view would essentially eliminate the exclusivity of
COCA’s appellate jurisdiction, if COCA’s decisions were undercut by writs
from the supreme court. Thus, the supreme court has recognized the need to
“construe[] in harmony” its superintending-control jurisdiction with
COCA’s exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases.42 And in practice, as this
article discusses, the supreme court until 2015 exercised superintendingcontrol jurisdiction over COCA only when necessary to resolve
jurisdictional disputes—a power that the supreme court is now explicitly
granted in the constitution.43 So the primary issue in boundary disputes—
regardless of whether appellate jurisdiction or superintending-control
jurisdiction was invoked—has been whether the case is civil or criminal.
II. The Development of the Jurisdictional Boundary
Initially, after COCA came into existence, a period of defining and
testing the jurisdictional boundaries occurred. Litigants were sometimes
40. See 1967 Okla. Sess. Laws 698.
41. Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 1978 OK 130, ¶¶ 10-24, 595 P.2d 416, 41920. The term “inferior courts” has been used in different ways. It is sometimes used to refer
to courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
173, 185 (1809). In state constitutions, the term usually applies to rank. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Harvey v. Medler, 142 P. 376, 378 (N.M. 1914) (“While it is true that the term ‘inferior
court’ is usually applied to courts of limited or special jurisdiction, yet it is used in different
senses, and frequently refers to relative rank and authority, and not to intrinsic quality. . . . It
was in this sense, in our opinion, that the term inferior courts is used in our
Constitution . . . .”). The use of the phrase “inferior to the Supreme Court” in Oklahoma’s
constitution clearly indicates the second meaning.
42. Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 33, 353 P.3d 532, 549.
43. See infra Section II.C.3.
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uncertain about which court had jurisdiction. More often, litigants who
were unsatisfied with the result in one court would seek a second opinion
via habeas petitions, petitions for writs of prohibition, or writs of
mandamus. Through this process, the courts began to delineate the
boundary, although not entirely consistently. In fact, the supreme court has
commented that the “dichotomous division of Oklahoma appeals into ‘civil’
and ‘criminal’ has never been perfectly airtight. Although case law
expressions might reject the concept of ‘shared’ power over any class of
appeals by clinging to ‘undivided’ and ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction in each class,
the marketplace reality contradicts such notion.” 44 Some of the history must
be reviewed to understand where the boundary presently appears to exist
and the policies and reasoning behind its placement. Further, some of these
early cases occasionally find their way into modern opinions, so it is
important to understand their origins.
A. 1908-1927: A Period of Comity Concluding with a Jurisdictional Battle
The early years were marked by a great deal of deference by both courts.
Most issues arose via requests for writs, and usually the courts could look at
the underlying case and decide whether the particular request was
considered civil or criminal based on which court would have had
jurisdiction over an appeal. For example, in Ex parte Fowler, one of the
first COCA cases to address the jurisdictional boundary, the petitioner had
been jailed for contempt in a civil case.45 COCA, apparently sua sponte,
held that it had no jurisdiction. 46 Because it would have had no jurisdiction
over an appeal of the underlying civil action, the court reasoned that it also
lacked jurisdiction over a habeas petition arising from the same action. 47
The court modestly announced that it had “no desire to intrude [its] views
upon matters wholly within the authority of the Supreme Court.” 48
Similarly, the supreme court deferred to COCA in a petition for writ of
prohibition alleging a double jeopardy violation. 49 After COCA had denied
a habeas petition based on the double jeopardy claim, the petitioner sought
relief from the supreme court. The court noted that COCA had the power to
44. Hale v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 1979 OK 158, ¶ 3 n.12, 603 P.2d 761, 763 (citations
omitted).
45. 105 P. 180 (Okla. Crim. App. 1909).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 182.
48. Id.
49. Jeter v. Dist. Court of Tulsa Cty., 1922 OK 140, 206 P. 831.
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issue a writ of mandamus in a criminal case, and that mandamus is “in the
nature of appellate jurisdiction,” and thus held that it had no jurisdiction. 50
The court reasoned that the petition was an attempt to receive an advance
determination of an issue that could be decided via appeal to COCA. 51 The
court also commented favorably that COCA’s declination of jurisdiction
over civil contempt actions was support for the “sound logic” of its own
restraint. 52
This deference extended to issues decided by COCA that arguably could
have fallen under the supreme court’s superintending jurisdiction over
inferior courts other than COCA. For example, in Herndon v. Hammond,
the court considered whether municipal courts had jurisdiction over liquor
ordinance violations. 53 The defendant sought a writ of prohibition from the
supreme court, but COCA had already decided the issue in another case. 54
The supreme court reasoned that because an appeal in the case would go to
COCA and the subject matter of the case was exclusively criminal, the
court “fe[lt] constrained to follow” COCA’s holding. 55 Similarly, the
supreme court deferred to COCA’s determination of jurisdiction between a
county court and district court in a misdemeanor nepotism case, despite
inconsistency with pre-COCA supreme court cases. 56 The supreme court
held that it would follow COCA’s decision regarding the lower courts’
jurisdiction over a criminal matter “since the enforcement of [criminal]
statutes must be in accordance with such construction.” 57
Other issues of statutory construction were not as clearly civil or
criminal, and in Flood v. State ex rel. Caldwell, 58 the supreme court
announced an important principle of comity for the construction of those
“mixed” statutes. The issue was the constitutionality of one section of the
Enforcing Act, Oklahoma’s liquor prohibition statute.59 The section
50. Id. ¶ 9, 206 P. at 834 (citing Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190 (1831)).
51. Id. ¶ 11, 206 P. at 834.
52. Id.
53. 1911 OK 159, 115 P. 775.
54. Ex parte Simmons, 1911 OK CR 14, 112 P. 951, overruled in part by Ex parte
Johnson, 1917 OK CR 3, 161 P. 1097.
55. Herndon, ¶ 4, 115 P. at 776.
56. State ex rel. Ikard v. Russell, 1912 OK 425, 124 P. 1092.
57. Id. ¶ 1, 124 P. at 1093; see also Ex parte Buchanan, 1925 OK 676, 240 P. 699 (same
regarding constitutionality of municipal criminal court); Ex parte Anderson, 1912 OK 437,
124 P. 980 (same regarding constitutionality of county court jurisdiction).
58. 1911 OK 27, 113 P. 914.
59. Id. ¶ 1, 113 P. at 914.
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empowered the governor to appoint counsel to enforce the act, in part by
bringing actions to recover monetary penalties. 60 In a criminal case, COCA
had already held that the appointment provision was constitutional.61 In a
one-paragraph opinion, the supreme court announced that it would follow
COCA’s conclusion because even though the statute in question—the
appointment provision—was “not a penal statute . . . . it has to do almost
solely with the enforcement of such statutes.” 62 Similarly, in State ex rel.
Perkins v. Sneed, the supreme court followed COCA’s decision regarding
the constitutionality of an act with civil and criminal provisions creating a
real estate commission. 63
The supreme court first carved out a civil issue from a criminal case in
Dunn v. State. 64 The issue was the forfeiture of an appearance bond.65 After
the defendant was late for his trial for the crime of perjury, the trial judge
continued the trial but ordered the bond forfeited.66 The defendant moved to
vacate the forfeiture and appealed the denial to the supreme court. The
court decided that it had jurisdiction, reasoning that although COCA had
exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases appealed from lower courts,
“[t]he instant case . . . is not a criminal case. The judgment appealed from
was not an adjudication of guilt, but was an adjudication that the principal
had breached the condition of his bond, i.e., incurred a civil liability, and
that he and his sureties were liable to the state.”67 The court reasoned that
the bond forfeiture was “an independent proceeding of a civil nature.” 68
The court’s decision in Dunn was questionable, both as a matter of
statutory construction, as well as a matter of policy. Both the constitution
and the statute creating COCA provide exclusive jurisdiction in criminal
cases. 69 The perjury case was indisputably criminal. Focusing on the order
being appealed rather than on the nature of the case served no purpose other
than to blur the boundary between civil and criminal cases. Particularly
considering that the purpose of the creation of COCA was to relieve the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
1909)).
69.

1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 612.
Childs v. State, 1910 OK CR 230, 113 P. 545.
Flood, ¶ 1, 113 P. at 914 (emphasis added).
1930 OK 248, 287 P. 1021.
1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193.
Id. ¶ 0, 166 P. at 193.
Id. ¶ 1, 166 P. at 193.
Id. ¶ 4, 166 P. at. 194 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 4, 166 P. at 195 (citing United States v. Dunne, 173 F. 254, 257 (9th Cir.
OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4; 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011).
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supreme court of some its caseload, and considering that decisions
regarding forfeiture of appearance bonds are fairly common casemanagement decisions, the court’s decision to assume jurisdiction over this
appeal seems unwise. Both COCA and the supreme court, however, have
continued to follow this decision in forfeiture cases.70
The first outright split between the courts involved a trial judge’s
disqualification in a criminal case. In State v. Brown, COCA held that it had
exclusive jurisdiction to decide the issue in a mandamus action.71 The State
had sought to disqualify a trial court judge because of his “bias and
prejudice in behalf of” a defendant charged with murder.72 The court noted
its constitutional and statutory mandate and denied the writ on the merits. 73
Regarding its jurisdiction, the court strongly stated its claim and asserted a
broad definition of exclusive jurisdiction:
Exclusive jurisdiction cannot be divided, but must be confined
solely and entirely to the court upon which it is conferred.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction of criminal cases means that this
court alone has the power to review and correct any and all
errors committed in criminal cases by the trial court. If any other
court shares such power with this court, our jurisdiction would
not be exclusive, and it would necessarily result in conflicts and
confusion, and would thereby destroy the unified and
harmonious enforcement of criminal law in Oklahoma. 74
Ten years later, the supreme court decided the same jurisdictional issue
with a different result, basing its decision on the superintending-control
jurisdiction given in the constitution. In Robertson v. Bozarth, a defendant
charged with accepting a bribe filed a mandamus action in the supreme
court, seeking the disqualification of the trial judge. 75 The court determined
that it had jurisdiction, basing that conclusion on some spurious
reasoning. 76 The court quoted the constitution, noting that its appellate

70. See, e.g., Machell v. State, 1970 OK 207, 481 P.2d 148; Hargrove v. State ex rel.
Dennis, 1964 OK CR 105, 396 P.2d 675.
71. 8 Okla. Crim. 40, 126 P. 245 (Okla. Crim. App. 1912).
72. Id. at 42, 126 P. at 246.
73. Id. at 41, 126 P. at 245.
74. Id. at 48, 126 P. at 249.
75. 1922 OK 288, 209 P. 742.
76. Id. ¶ 2, 209 P. at 742.
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jurisdiction was limited to civil cases. 77 The court then cited the statutory
definition of a criminal case as “one prosecuted by the state as a party,
against a person charged with a public offense, for the punishment thereof,”
and the definition of a civil case as “every other.”78 The court then noted
that, regarding original jurisdiction, it had superintending control over all
inferior courts, with the power to issue, inter alia, writs of mandamus. 79
Because the petition for writ was an original action in the supreme court,
the court deemed that to be the “case” at issue and was “forced to the
conclusion” that it was a civil matter, being that the action in the supreme
court was the petition for a writ, not the state prosecuting a defendant
charged with an offense. 80
This reasoning took the Dunn analysis to another extreme, focusing on
the writ being requested, rather than on the case from which the issue had
arisen or even the particular issue being contested. The court disclaimed
any interest in whether COCA would have had jurisdiction had the action
been brought there initially, finding that “unnecessary to decide” because
the supreme court had jurisdiction over the original action before it.81 The
court did not even mention the exclusivity language of the constitution or
the statute regarding appellate jurisdiction and thus made no attempt to
harmonize the two. 82 The court reached the same result in Heard v.
Sullivan, again reasoning that the exclusivity of appellate jurisdiction was
irrelevant because mandamus was within the court’s superintending control
over the trial court.83
Fortunately, the courts have never cited either Robertson or Heard for
this jurisdictional analysis, and this line of reasoning is inconsistent with the
courts’ present treatment of the issue. In fact, the Rules for District Courts
promulgated by the supreme court specifically provide that original
mandamus proceedings to disqualify a judge in a criminal case shall be

77. Id. ¶ 2, 209 P. at 742-43.
78. Id. ¶ 11, 209 P. at 743 (quoting 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 7-8 (repealed 1984)).
79. Id. ¶ 2, 209 P. at 742-43.
80. Id. ¶ 14, 209 P. at 743. As support, the court cited Marshall v. Sitton, 1918 OK 110,
172 P. 964, where the supreme court affirmed mandamus in a criminal case where the
district court had ordered the county court to change venue. The supreme court did not
address its jurisdiction, even though the case was clearly criminal in nature.
81. Robertson, ¶ 16, 209 P. at 744.
82. Id.
83. 1955 OK 41, ¶ 3, 280 P.2d 708, 709.
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brought in COCA, and that such cases “will be transferred to the proper
court” if civil or criminal matters are sought in the wrong forum. 84
The relations of respectful deference came to a temporary halt in 1927,
when an unusual set of circumstances resulted in a battle of competing
orders from the two courts.85 The underlying case was a civil one.86 At one
point in the proceedings, one of the litigants, Owens, filed a motion that the
supreme court deemed to contain false statements, contemptuous of the
court. 87 The motion alleged that an opinion of the court had actually been
written by the plaintiff’s counsel and that one justice was “under the control
and direction” of another counsel.88 The supreme court found Owens in
contempt and ordered twelve months imprisonment and a $5000 fine. 89
Within a few minutes of receipt of the contempt order, Owens filed a
habeas application with COCA. 90 COCA issued a show-cause order and
ordered him released on bond. 91 The supreme court then issued a writ of
prohibition against COCA, prohibiting it from altering the supreme court’s
final judgment. 92 Owens then filed a new habeas petition with COCA, and
the supreme court issued a new writ of prohibition. 93 Despite the writ,
COCA granted the habeas petition and discharged Owens from the
judgment of the supreme court.94 In its opinion, COCA seemed to
characterize the contempt as a criminal case because of the sanction that
was issued: a sanction that the judges believed was excessive.95
Unsurprisingly, the supreme court was not amused, reciting that COCA’s
order was “127 typewritten pages” and that it would serve “no useful
purpose to meander with the intemperate and rude statements found

84. OKLA. DIST. CT. R. 15(b).
85. Dancy v. Owens, 1927 OK 203, 258 P. 879.
86. Id. ¶ 24, 258 P. at 884.
87. See Ex parte Owens, 37 Okla. Crim. 118, 258 P. 758 (Okla. Crim. App. 1927),
vacated, Dancy, ¶ 41, 258 P. at 887.
88. State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Davenport, 1927 OK 137, ¶ 7, 256 P. 340, 350 (quoting
Ex parte Owens, 37 Okla. Crim. at 149, 258 P. at 770).
89. Id. ¶ 8, 256 P. at 350-51.
90. Id. ¶ 2, 256 P. at 341-42.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ex parte Owens, 37 Okla. Crim. 118, 204, 258 P. 758, 786 (Okla. Crim. App. 1927),
vacated, Dancy, ¶ 41, 258 P. at 887.
95. Id. at 277, 258 P. at 810-11.
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therein.” 96 For the first time, the court granted a writ of certiorari and held
that COCA had acted beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction.97 The court
recited articles 1 and 2 of the original constitution, using those articles to
establish the proposition that COCA was an “inferior” court because it was
established by the legislature, and thus was subject to the supreme court’s
superintending control. 98 Although COCA has appellate jurisdiction in a
criminal case, the court focused on the habeas petition as an original action
in COCA. 99 The action was not an appeal, because it was not brought from
a lower court to correct an error. And the underlying issue was contempt in
a civil case, clearly outside the definition of a criminal case. Relying on
United States Supreme Court precedent, the court reasoned that contempt is
sui generis, within the power of each court, and is not a criminal case
merely because of the sanction.100 The court closed its opinion with a
slightly veiled threat of more serious consequences should COCA continue
to entertain habeas petitions in the case. 101
B. 1927-2010: Deference with Exceptions
For the most part, the courts stayed free of conflict after Dancy, and a
spirit of comity again prevailed throughout the rest of the courts’ first
hundred years. For example, in Hall v. Welch, the supreme court declined
jurisdiction of an appeal on the issue of whether testimony was compelled
and thus the basis of immunity from prosecution.102 In Ex parte Meek, the
court declined to declare a securities statute unconstitutional under the
United States Constitution where COCA had already ruled on the issue. 103
Interestingly, the court stated that it indeed had the right to declare criminal
provisions in violation of the United States Constitution, but it declined to

96. Dancy, ¶ 3, 258 P. at 881.
97. Id. ¶¶ 28, 40, 258 P. at 885, 886.
98. Id. ¶ 10, 258 P. at 881.
99. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 258 P. at 884.
100. Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 258 P. at 885-86.
101. Id. ¶ 42, 258 P. at 887 (“If more stringent means are necessary to keep the Criminal
Court of Appeals within the legislative authority granted it, such means are adequate, and if
necessary, will be used, however reluctant this court may be, if such necessity is brought
about by that court.”)
102. 1931 OK 548, 3 P.2d 232.
103. 1933 OK 473, 25 P.2d 54.
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exercise that right because of its policy to avoid jurisdictional conflicts with
COCA when possible. 104
Despite this spirit of comity, issues of boundary location occasionally
arose during this period. But the issues were always resolved peacefully,
without competing orders from the two courts. Three notable areas of line
drawing have relevance to the modern jurisdictional disputes: (1)
ambiguous jurisdictional statutes, 105 (2) carve-outs from criminal cases for
“institutional deficiency” 106 claims, and (3) issues regarding punishment in
criminal cases. 107
1. Jurisdictional Conflicts Created by Statute
Occasionally, statutes have created jurisdictional conflicts, either because
of ambiguity or somewhat conflicting provisions. Carder v. Court of
Criminal Appeals, 108 the case where the supreme court noted the break from
fifty years of jurisdictional peace, involved a statute providing appellate
jurisdiction in juvenile cases. 109 In an unusual set of facts, a juvenile court
judge had entered an order finding the juvenile a delinquent child and a
ward of the court, and placing him in the custody of the State.110 The boy’s
father sought a return of custody after allegations that the boy had been
abused in the state school where he was placed. 111 Upon application by the
State, COCA granted a writ prohibiting the juvenile court from hearing the
change-of-custody motion. 112 Barred from conducting the hearing, the
juvenile court instead dismissed the case against the juvenile, thus freeing
him from the State’s custody. 113 COCA granted mandamus against the
judge, directing him to vacate the order.114

104. Id. ¶ 11, 25 P.2d at 56. The court offered no authority for such a right, and that claim
is inconsistent with the change to the statute removing the exception for Constitutional
claims. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
105. See In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶¶ 8, 13, 145 P.3d 1040, 1044, 1047.
106. Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 23, 353 P.3d 532, 543.
107. State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, 1990 OK 3, ¶ 15, 786 P.2d 82, 86.
108. 1978 OK 130, 595 P.2d 416.
109. Id. ¶¶ 14-17, 595 P.2d at 419-20 (citing 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1123 (1971) (current
version at 10A OKLA. STAT. § 1-5-101 (2011)).
110. Id. ¶ 4, 595 P.2d at 418.
111. Id. ¶ 5, 595 P.2d at 418.
112. State ex rel. Dep’t of Insts., Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v. Maley, 1977 OK CR 299, ¶¶ 34, 569 P.2d 1020, 1021.
113. Id. ¶ 6, 569 P.2d at 1021.
114. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/2

2017]

THE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARY

217

Petitioners, the juvenile and his father, then asked the supreme court for
a writ of prohibition against COCA, contending that COCA had exceeded
its jurisdiction. 115 The supreme court agreed, vacating COCA’s order. 116
The court noted COCA’s power to issue writs in aid of its jurisdiction but
held that COCA had no jurisdiction because the order could not have been
appealed to COCA. 117 The supreme court’s decision rested on a very strict
interpretation of the jurisdictional statute. The statute regarding juvenile
cases provided that appeals from orders in juvenile cases were to the
supreme court, except that “appeals taken from a trial court's decision in a
proceeding for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency or in a proceeding
certifying a juvenile to stand trial as an adult or denying such certification
shall be taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals.”118 The supreme court
reasoned that the order dismissing the case was a post-dispositional order—
not an adjudication of juvenile delinquency—and as such did not fall within
the statutory exceptions.119
This interpretation was not entirely without support: juvenile
delinquency had already been adjudicated, so the dismissal was not a
proceeding for adjudication. On the other hand, the juvenile court retained
jurisdiction after the adjudication, so COCA’s broader interpretation of
“proceeding” was also defensible because dismissal of the entire case was
arguably part of the same “proceeding.” At least plausibly, this was a case
of the supreme court strictly interpreting the statute to assume jurisdiction
only because the court thought that COCA’s decision on the merits was
clearly wrong. COCA had upheld the State’s contention that once a child
was adjudged delinquent and placed in state custody, the State assumed the
role of parent and the child was beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. The supreme court found this reasoning contrary to statute and public
policy, so it intervened to protect the juvenile court’s role in supervising
delinquent children as wards of the court.120
Procedurally, the court proceeded carefully because it wanted to resolve
the jurisdictional conflict in the manner “least disruptive to our appellate

115. Carder, ¶ 2, 595 P.2d at 418.
116. Id. ¶ 40, 595 P.2d at 422.
117. Id. ¶ 16, 595 P.2d at 420.
118. Id. ¶ 14, 595 P.2d at 419 (emphasis added) (citing 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1123 (1971)
(current version at 10A OKLA. STAT. § 1-5-101 (2011)).
119. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 595 P.2d at 419-20.
120. Id. ¶ 31, 595 P.2d at 421.
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process.” 121 Noting that “[t]here is no appeal or proceeding in error from
the Court of Criminal Appeals to this Court,” the court recast the action as a
proceeding for certiorari rather than prohibition.122 The court recited its
constitutional power to grant writs of certiorari, resolved the issue on the
merits, and ended the litigation.123 Because the court determined that
COCA had acted outside its jurisdiction, this manner of proceeding was
clearly correct under the supreme court’s constitutional power to determine
which court has jurisdiction. Even without this specific constitutional
power, this would have been a valid exercise of the supreme court’s
superintending power to ensure that inferior courts are acting within their
jurisdiction. 124
Comparatively, statutory jurisdictional issues regarding grand juries have
been resolved amicably, with extreme deference and expressions of respect
between the two courts. Statutes provide for supreme court jurisdiction to
convene a multicounty grand jury, 125 but any matters not specifically
covered by the multicounty grand jury statutes are subject to the grand jury
statutes. 126 Thus, appeals regarding criminal-type issues would fall under
COCA’s criminal jurisdiction. 127 For example, in Movants to Quash Grand
Jury Subpoenas Issued in Multicounty Grand Jury v. Powers, COCA issued
a stay of grand jury subpoenas and referred the matter to the supreme court
for decision. 128 The court decided the First Amendment claim to quash
investigative subpoenas and decided issues regarding the relative powers of
the Ethics Commission and the grand jury. 129 The court also announced that
future grand jury issues would be resolved on an issue-by-issue basis

121. Id. ¶ 19, 595 P.2d at 420.
122. Id. ¶ 20, 595 P.2d at 420.
123. Id. ¶¶ 29-40, 595 P.2d at 421-22.
124. For an example of the supreme court using its superintending power without a
jurisdictional boundary conflict, see Jackson v. Freeman, 1995 OK 100, 905 P.2d 217. In
Jackson, a defendant’s conviction had been affirmed by a panel of the Emergency Appellate
Division of COCA. Id. ¶ 0, 905 P.2d at 217. The defendant contended that the panel—
authorized by the legislature and comprised of non-COCA judges appointed by the Chief
Justice of the supreme court—was unconstitutional. Id. The court recast the defendant’s quo
warranto petition as a request for prohibition and held that it had jurisdiction to decide the
request, citing Carder. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 905 P.2d at 219-20.
125. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 351 (2011).
126. Id. § 350.
127. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4.
128. 1992 OK 142, ¶ 1, 839 P.2d 655.
129. Id. ¶¶ 5-10, 839 P.2d at 656-57.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss2/2

2017]

THE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARY

219

because this grand jury was addressing some non-criminal issues regarding
removal of persons from office. 130 Later, when an issue concerning secrecy
of testimony arose regarding the same grand jury, the parties filed separate
mandamus petitions in each court. The supreme court consolidated the
cases and transferred them to COCA. 131 In holding that witness-immunity
hearings must be closed to the public, COCA was careful to avoid
conflict. 132 As part of its analysis, the court noted that “[b]ecause of such
dual jurisdiction over grand jury matters, it is important that the two courts
do not take conflicting positions concerning grand jury secrecy. We do not
find that our position requiring secrecy of grand jury proceedings is in
conflict with positions taken by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.” 133
Similarly, in Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v.
Dixon, COCA referred to the supreme court the issue of whether a
multicounty grand jury lacks jurisdiction to investigate crimes alleged to
have occurred in only one county. 134 Because the issue involved “a
generalized analysis of constitutional and statutory norms,” the supreme
court retained jurisdiction.135 And in a similar show of deference, the
supreme court transferred a grand jury matter to COCA. 136 In Woolverton v.
Multi-County Grand Jury, the petitioners had filed an original action in the
supreme court, seeking a writ of prohibition regarding a multicounty grand
jury's subpoena for fingerprints, palm prints, and blood samples.137 Because
the issue involved constitutional issues of the grand jury's authority “to
conduct discovery in the form of a bodily search as part of a criminal
investigation,” the supreme court reasoned that the case was within
COCA’s jurisdiction and transferred it. 138
Thus, in these and other cases where statutes contained or created
jurisdictional ambiguity, the courts have worked well together. The
supreme court has resolved the ambiguities via its constitutional power to

130. Id. ¶ 2, 839 P.2d at 656.
131. Griffin Television v. Powers (In re Proceedings of Multicounty Grand Jury), 1993
OK CR 12, ¶ 2, 847 P.2d 812, 813.
132. Id. ¶ 3, 847 P.2d at 813.
133. Id. ¶ 12, 847 P.2d at 815.
134. 2008 OK 36, ¶ 0, 184 P.3d 546.
135. Id. ¶ 11, 184 P.3d at 549.
136. Id. ¶ 10, 184 P.3d at 549.
137. 1993 OK CR 42, ¶¶ 1-2, 859 P.2d 1112, 1113.
138. Dixon, ¶ 10, 184 P.3d at 549.
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determine which court has jurisdiction, and COCA has accepted the
decisions without incident. 139
2. Attorney Fees in Criminal Cases: “Institutional Deficiencies”
In 1977, the supreme court carved out another jurisdictional area in
Sanders v. Followell, 140 which it has since referred to as civil jurisdiction
over claims of “institutional deficiencies” or “the proper functioning of a
governmental entity.” 141 The issue in Sanders was construction of the
statute providing a fee to appointed counsel in death penalty cases. 142 The
attorneys petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge to
award the statutory fee for each of three defendants represented, rather than
one fee per case. 143 Without addressing any jurisdictional issue vis-à-vis
COCA—presumably because no such issue was raised—the court granted
the writ. 144 The court did address the propriety of mandamus, reasoning that
the matter was “publici juris[] and of immediate concern to the orderly
administration of justice,” but it did not consider whether the case may have
been within COCA’s jurisdiction. 145
In fact, supreme court jurisdiction in such a case was not at all obvious.
The issue of payment of counsel in death cases can arise only in criminal
cases. COCA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, and the
supreme court has previously stated that mandamus is in the nature of
appellate jurisdiction.146 And although publici juris is sometimes cited as an
independent basis for jurisdiction,147 whether the matter was indeed publici
139. See Hale v. Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs, 1979 OK 158, 603 P.2d 761 (After COCA
rejected a sheriff’s appeal of his ouster, the supreme court treated the appeal as a civil appeal
transferred by COCA. Although the ouster proceeding was conducted as a misdemeanor trial
as required by statute, the proceeding was civil because it results in no criminal
punishment.); see also Courtney v. State, 2013 OK 64, 307 P.3d 337 (holding, after the
defendant appealed to both courts, that the supreme court had jurisdiction to decide the
appeal regarding a claim of actual innocence under the Governmental Tort Claims Act, even
though the defendant’s request to the trial court had been made as part of his post-conviction
proceeding).
140. 1977 OK 143, 567 P.2d 84.
141. Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 23, 353 P.3d 532, 543.
142. Sanders, ¶ 4, 567 P.2d at 85.
143. Id. ¶ 1, 567 P.2d at 85.
144. Id. ¶ 6, 567 P.2d at 86.
145. Id.
146. Jeter v. Dist. Court of Tulsa Cty., 1922 OK 140, ¶ 9, 206 P. 831, 833-34 (citing Ex
parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190 (1831)).
147. See, e.g., Naylor v. Petuskey, 1992 OK 88, ¶ 1, 834 P.2d 439, 440.
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juris under a broad definition of the term was not relevant to whether the
matter was civil or criminal.148 Assuming jurisdiction was consistent with
the court’s taking jurisdiction over bond forfeiture in Dunn v. State. 149 This
again focuses on the order being appealed rather than the nature of the case.
And at first blush, carving out this exception serves no obvious purpose and
could have been left to COCA. On the other hand, construction of the
attorney fee statute has no relationship to the guilt or punishment of the
defendant, the usual subjects of appeals in criminal cases. Furthermore, the
maximum amount of the attorney fee is somewhat linked to the supreme
court’s function of regulating the practice of law. 150 But all things
considered, the decision seems to unnecessarily intrude on COCA’s
jurisdiction.
This link to regulating the practice of law is more apparent in State v.
Lynch, where the supreme court assumed jurisdiction of an appeal
regarding payment of court-appointed attorneys in capital crime cases. 151
The trial court had held that the statutory limit on attorney fees was
unconstitutional and awarded the attorneys a fee based on an hourly rate.
(The appeal was consolidated with an original jurisdiction request from
three county bar associations dealing with the same issue.)152 The court
affirmed the attorney fees award, with slight modifications, and announced
guidelines and procedures for courts to follow until the legislature acted to
fill the void created by the unconstitutionality of the statute.153 The court
relied on its superintending-control jurisdiction, its managerial and
administrative authority over the district courts, and its “direct and inherent
constitutional power to regulate the practice of law.”154
In Lynch, the supreme court ignored the possibility that COCA had
jurisdiction. But its assumption of jurisdiction was better grounded than in
Sanders. The court noted that the same issue arose in civil guardianship
148. Cf. Keating v. Johnson, 1996 OK 61, ¶ 4, 918 P.2d 51, 61 (Simms, J., concurring)
(“[I]t should be remembered that the doctrine of publici juris is not a ground of jurisdiction
in itself. It is merely one factor a court may consider in deciding whether to assume original
jurisdiction when such jurisdiction already exists on proper grounds.”)
149. 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193; see supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
150. Cf. State v. Lynch, 1990 OK 82, ¶ 27, 796 P.2d 1150, 1162-63; In re Integration of
State Bar, 1939 OK 378, 95 P.2d 113.
151. 1990 OK 82, ¶ 0, 796 P.2d 1150, 1152.
152. Id. ¶¶ 0-1, 796 P.2d at 1152-53.
153. Id. ¶¶ 21-24, 796 P.2d at 1161-62.
154. Id. ¶¶ 26-28, 796 P.2d at 1162-63 (footnote omitted) (citing OKLA. CONST. art. 7, §§
4, 6).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

222

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:203

proceedings. 155 So the need for consistency among all court-appointment
cases combined with the court’s duty to regulate the practice of law provide
a firmer justification for supreme court jurisdiction.
3. Issues Regarding Punishment in Criminal Cases
One important development during this period was the supreme court’s
analysis of the jurisdictional aspects of issues regarding punishment in
criminal cases, an analysis that resulted in complete jurisdictional deference
to COCA. In Hinkle v. Kenny, the supreme court denied a writ of
mandamus on an issue of statutory construction regarding whether
particular sentences should run consecutively or concurrently. 156 In holding
that COCA’s decision regarding construction of penal statutes should be
followed, 157 the court impliedly (and wisely) abandoned its pronouncement
in Robertson that mandamus was a civil matter that gave rise to supreme
court jurisdiction, either solely or concurrently with COCA. 158 In Hinkle,
the petitioner specifically argued that mandamus was a civil matter, as
opposed to a habeas petition which would be essentially criminal when the
underlying case was criminal.159 The court found the distinction
unpersuasive. More importantly, the opinion shows that the supreme court
considered sentencing statutes to be within the jurisdictional realm of
COCA, just as previous issues regarding other statutes that the court
deemed predominantly criminal.
Issues regarding implementation of the sentence of a criminal defendant
were also held to be within the jurisdiction of COCA. In State ex rel. Henry
v. Mahler, the court addressed how an amendment to the earned credit
statute applied to prior crimes. 160 COCA, in a somewhat surprising refusal
to assume jurisdiction, held that it lacked jurisdiction because the question
was an administrative decision for the Department of Corrections, not a
proper subject of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. 161 The supreme court,
exercising its constitutional power to resolve jurisdictional conflicts, denied
the requested relief of prohibition or certiorari and held that COCA should
155. Id. ¶ 5, 796 P.2d at 1155.
156. 1936 OK 582, ¶¶ 1-4, 13, 62 P.2d 621, 621-22, 623.
157. Id. ¶ 12, 62 P.2d at 622-23.
158. See Robertson v. Bozarth, 1922 OK 288, ¶¶ 12-14, 209 P. 742, 743.
159. Hinkle, ¶ 12, 62 P.2d at 622.
160. 1990 OK 3, ¶¶ 1-2, 786 P.2d 82, 83.
161. Mahler v. State, 1989 OK CR 62, ¶ 2, 781 P.2d 835, 835-36, modified, 1989 OK CR
82, 783 P.2d 973.
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have decided the question. 162 The court reasoned that matters regarding
punishment and release are “clearly” within the jurisdiction of COCA,
quoting with approval a statement from a COCA opinion that an “essential
part of the judgment is the punishment and the amount thereof.”163
Similarly, Smith v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections addressed the
issue of whether the Department of Corrections unlawfully supervising
defendants past the two-year statutory period was criminal in nature. 164
After the trial court dismissed a civil suit regarding the claims, the supreme
court transferred the appeal to COCA.165 A separate claim for supervision
fees was civil but required resolution of the criminal issue first.166 And in
the same vein, the supreme court referred to COCA an issue of whether a
juvenile court could extend jurisdiction over a youthful offender until age
twenty. 167 Finding the statute silent as to appellate jurisdiction, the court
reasoned that the case was criminal because the youthful offender was
charged with a crime, the procedure was similar to that of a criminal trial,
and the punishment available was identical to adult punishment except for a
maximum sentence. 168
Finally, the supreme court applied this reasoning to a civil rights action
challenging an execution on grounds that the defendants had interfered with
the attorney-client relationship and deprived the plaintiff of access to the
courts. 169 In Maynard v. Layden, a COCA opinion, the court noted that the
supreme court had held that it had no jurisdiction to enjoin an execution
because the issue was one of punishment. 170 COCA then prohibited the
district court from enjoining the execution.171

162. Henry, ¶¶ 15-20, 786 P.2d at 86-87.
163. Id. ¶ 15, 786 P.2d at 86 (quoting Ex parte Rice, 1930 OK 279, 289 P. 360).
164. 2001 OK 95, ¶ 3, 37 P.3d 872, 873.
165. Id. ¶¶ 5, 11, 37 P.3d at 873, 874.
166. Id. ¶ 10, 37 P.3d at 874.
167. In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶ 1, 145 P.3d 1040, 1041.
168. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 145 P.3d at 1047.
169. See Maynard v. Layden, 1992 OK CR 31, ¶ 3, 830 P.2d 581, 582. Though the
original supreme court order in Maynard is no longer available, Justice Taylor referred to the
precedent as recently as 2014. See Lockett III, 2014 OK 33, 356 P.3d 58, 61-62 (Taylor, J.,
dissenting).
170. Maynard, ¶ 3, 830 P.2d at 582.
171. Id. ¶ 10, 830 P.2d at 583.
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C. 2011-2016: A Departure from Comity
Although not rising to the same level of conflict, cases in the past five
years have given rise to acrimony between the two courts not seen since
Dancy. The supreme court has issued orders in three criminal cases,
including stays of the proceedings in two of the cases. These encroachments
are not easily explained by previous line-drawing cases, and in some
respects seem flatly inconsistent with them.
1. Leftwich v. Court of Criminal Appeals
Leftwich v. Court of Criminal Appeals 172 was the first case since
Dancy 173 in 1927 where the two courts issued somewhat conflicting
statements about their jurisdiction in back-and-forth orders. Like Carder 174
in 1977, the last time the supreme court overrode a jurisdictional
determination of COCA, the statements arose in a case where the supreme
court obviously disagreed with COCA’s decision on the merits. Leftwich
was a state legislator charged with a felony for soliciting or accepting an
offer of a state job to be created in exchange for her agreement to withdraw
as a candidate for re-election. 175 She moved to dismiss the charges on
various grounds, including immunity from prosecution under the Oklahoma
Constitution’s speech or debate clause.176 When the motions were denied,
she filed a petition with COCA for mandamus or prohibition. 177 COCA
denied the petition on multiple grounds, but COCA’s order included the
following statement: “The Speech and Debate Clause in the Oklahoma
Constitution includes an express exception for felonies.” 178
That statement was incorrect. The Oklahoma Constitution’s speech or
debate clause is almost identical to the clause in the United States
Constitution. 179 And the United States Constitution’s exception for felonies
172. (Leftwich I), 2011 OK 80, 262 P.3d 750 (Mem.).
173. See text accompanying notes 77-88.
174. See text accompanying notes 93-108.
175. Leftwich I, ¶ 2, 262 P.3d at 751 (Watt, J., dissenting).
176. Order Denying Petition for Writ of Prohibition and in the Alternative Petition for
Writ of Mandamus at 1-2, Leftwich v. Alcorn, No. PR-2011-319 (Okla. Crim. App. June 9,
2011).
177. Id. at 1.
178. Id. at 3.
179. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“The Senators and Representatives . . . . shall
in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest . . . ;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other
Place.”) with OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 22 (“Senators and Representatives shall, except for
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applies to the privilege from arrest, not the privilege for speech or debate. 180
So Leftwich moved to the supreme court, filing a petition for prohibition,
mandamus, or declaratory relief.181 She did not seek any relief on the merits
of her case—only a declaration that COCA’s statement regarding a felony
exception was legally incorrect.182 She pointed to prior supreme court
decisions holding that the Oklahoma speech or debate clause provides “at
least as much protection" as the immunity granted by the comparable
provisions of the Federal Constitution, and thus cast the statements as a
direct conflict between the two courts.183 The supreme court issued a stay in
the trial court and heard oral argument. 184 At the oral argument, all counsel
agreed that COCA’s interpretation of the clause “should not be enforced as
the parties perceive that portion of the order to be a mistake of law.” 185
Based on counsel’s agreement and the court’s own review of the matter, the
court announced in a brief order that it declined to assume jurisdiction in
order to allow the parties to return to COCA and seek relief.186 The court
also dissolved its stay. 187
When Leftwich returned to COCA, COCA declined to assume
jurisdiction—on procedural grounds. Finding that Leftwich essentially
sought a rehearing of the order declining to issue the writ, the court held

treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the
Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same, and, for any speech or debate in
either House, shall not be questioned in any other place.”).
180. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 8.8(a), 8.9(a) (4th ed. 2007). The
COCA order may have been referring to the entirety of section 22 as the “Speech and Debate
Clause,” but such a reference would have been inapplicable for two reasons. First, Leftwich
was not seeking to avoid arrest. Second, the privilege from arrest has been interpreted to
apply only to civil cases and is now considered obsolete. Id. § 8.9(a).
181. Leftwich I, 2011 OK 80, ¶ 1, 262 P.3d 750, 750 (Mem.).
182. Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and/or Mandamus, or in the Alternative, Declaratory Relief at 10, Leftwich I, 2011 OK 80,
262 P.3d 750 (No. 109609).
183. Id. at 9; see, e.g., Brock v. Thompson, 1997 OK 127, ¶ 14, 948 P.2d 279, 287 (“The
Speech or Debate Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 5, § 22, absolutely protects
legislators from suit calling for judicial inquiry into their performance 'within the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity.'")(citations omitted).
184. Leftwich I, ¶¶ 2-4, 262 P.3d at 750-51.
185. Id. ¶ 2, 262 P.3d at 750.
186. Id. ¶ 3, 262 P.3d at 750.
187. Id. ¶ 4, 262 P.3d at 751.
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that its rules did not provide for such a rehearing. 188 Further, the new
application was time-barred under the court’s rules. 189 Finally, COCA
disagreed that its previous statement was a mistake of law, stating that the
speech or debate clause indeed includes an exception for felonies.190 (A
concurring opinion defended COCA’s original order but instead focused on
the question of whether the conduct was merely related to legislative affairs
or was part of the legislative process, an issue that required further factfinding at the trial-court level.) 191
Ultimately, Leftwich agreed to a bench trial and was found guilty,
reserving only the issue of whether she was a candidate for office, as
required by the elements of the crime charged.192 Her conviction was
affirmed, so COCA never addressed speech or debate issues again.193 The
case is instructive regarding the jurisdictional boundary, however, because
statements in the opinions indicate each court’s view, or in some cases each
justice’s or judge’s view, of the relationship. The supreme court’s majority
opinion stated that the court did not need to address its “supervisory writ
jurisdiction over the Court of Criminal Appeals.”194 In other words, the
majority recognized the possibility of exercising superintending jurisdiction
over COCA as an inferior court but did not reach the issue of whether this
was an appropriate case. Two justices dissented, advocating to assume
jurisdiction and dismiss the entire criminal case. 195 Regarding jurisdiction,
the dissenting justices considered the criminal nature of the case as
irrelevant, reasoning that the supreme court had constitutional power to
prohibit the district attorney from acting in excess of his authority. 196 Only
one justice, in a concurrence, wanted to dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction because of COCA’s exclusive jurisdiction in criminal
matters. 197
The COCA majority opinion did not address its jurisdiction vis-à-vis the
supreme court, because it declined jurisdiction based on its own rules. But
188. Leftwich v. Alcorn (Leftwich II), 2011 OK CR 27, ¶¶ 3-4, 262 P.3d 770, 771.
189. Id.
190. Id. ¶ 5, 262 P.3d at 771.
191. Id. ¶¶ 1-14, 262 P.3d at 772-76 (Johnson, J., concurring).
192. Leftwich v. State (Leftwich III), 2015 OK CR 5, ¶ 1, 350 P.3d 149, 151.
193. Id. ¶ 44, 350 P.3d at 162.
194. Leftwich I, 2011 OK 80, ¶ 3, 262 P.3d 750, 750 (Mem.).
195. Id. ¶ 1, 262 P.3d at 751 (Watt, J., dissenting); id. ¶¶ 13, 23, 262 P.3d at 754, 757
(Reif, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id. ¶ 7, 262 P.3d at 751 (Winchester, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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in a concurrence to the second COCA order, one judge quoted the statement
regarding superintending jurisdiction from the supreme court’s majority
opinion, and “[t]o avoid any confusion . . . remind[ed] the parties that . . .
this Court exercises exclusive appellate and writ jurisdiction in all criminal
cases.” 198 This statement seems to imply that its author does not believe that
the supreme court has any type of jurisdiction over COCA in a criminal
case. Thus, leading up to Lockett, differences of opinion were apparent
regarding the relationship between the two courts.199
2. Lockett v. State
Lockett began as a declaratory judgment action in the Oklahoma County
District Court. The plaintiffs, prisoners awaiting execution, sought a
declaration that title 22, section 1015(B)—the statute providing procedures
for executions—was unconstitutional. 200 The plaintiffs contended that the
statute’s secrecy provisions—preventing discovery of the identity of the
suppliers of lethal drugs—denied them access to the courts. 201 They also
sought an order enjoining enforcement of the statute and enjoining their
executions. 202 After the defendants sought to remove the case to federal
court, 203 and the plaintiffs amended their complaint,204 the district court
initially denied the request for a temporary order and injunction, reasoning
that COCA had jurisdiction over the issues. 205 The plaintiffs appealed that
decision to the supreme court and requested a stay of their executions. 206
The supreme court remanded the case (what it called the “civil claims”) to
the district court, with the exception of the stay request, which it transferred

198. Leftwich II, 2011 OK CR 27, ¶ 4 n.2, 262 P.3d 770, 773 n.2 (Smith, J., concurring).
199. See generally 5 HARVEY D. ELLIS, JR. & CLYDE A. MUCHMORE, OKLAHOMA
APPELLATE PRACTICE § 1.9 (2014-2015 ed. 2014) (discussing Leftwich and describing the
“contours of the jurisdictional boundary” as “nebulous”).
200. Petition for Declaratory Relief and Request for Injunction at 3, Lockett v. Evans,
No. CV-2014-330 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Cty. Feb. 26, 2014).
201. Id. at 22.
202. Id.
203. Notice of Removal of Civil Action, Lockett v. Evans, No. CV-2014-330 (Dist. Ct.
Okla. Cty. Mar. 4, 2014).
204. Amended Petition for Declaratory Relief and Request for Injunction, Lockett v.
Evans, No. CV-14-330, 2014 WL 6879907 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Cty. Mar. 7, 2014).
205. Lockett v. Evans, No. CV-2014-330, 2014 WL 6809101, at *1 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Cty.
Mar. 11, 2014).
206. Lockett III, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 4, 356 P.3d 58, 59 (per curiam) (Mem.).
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to COCA. 207 COCA dismissed the stay request as moot because the State
advised that it lacked the drugs required for the execution. 208
The district court then held that the secrecy provision of the statute was
unconstitutional, 209 which the State appealed to the supreme court. 210
Armed with the district court’s order, the plaintiffs again sought a stay from
COCA. 211 COCA again denied the stay, relying on the statute that sets the
deadlines for carrying out executions.212 That statute also provides that
COCA may stay execution dates under certain circumstances, specifically
under subsection (C), when “an action challenging the conviction or
sentence of death is pending before it.”213 Subsections (D), (E), and (F)
provide for setting new execution dates if “any state or federal court” issues
a stay that is later dissolved or vacated.214 COCA reasoned that because
there was no pending action before COCA under Oklahoma statute title 22,
section 1001.1(C), the court lacked power to issue a stay. 215
At that point, the supreme court again retained jurisdiction over the
appeal of what it considered the civil claims—those related to the
constitutionality of the secrecy provision of the execution statute.216 The
court again transferred the stay request to COCA. In the order transferring
the stay request, the court criticized COCA’s interpretation of the statute,
saying it ignored the
clear language of remaining portions of the statute which
expressly provide for stays to be issued in other circumstances
than those relating solely to the possibility that a conviction may
be overturned or a sentence vacated. Subsections (D) through
(F), all contemplate that stays may be issued by “any state or
federal court.” In Oklahoma, we determine the courts having
207. Id. ¶ 5, 356 P.3d 58, 59.
208. Lockett v. State, Nos. D-2000-1330 and D-2003-829 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 18,
2014) (order vacating and resetting execution dates).
209. Lockett v. Evans, No. CV-2014-330, slip op. at 2 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Cty. Apr. 1, 2014).
210. Lockett III, ¶ 8, 356 P.3d at 60. The plaintiffs also appealed the portion of the
district court’s order “that the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to
the execution protocol and that the protocol does not constitute an unconstitutional
delegation of authority by the Legislature.” Id.
211. See Lockett v. State (Lockett II), 2014 OK CR 3, ¶ 2, 329 P.3d 755, 756-57.
212. Id.
213. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1001.1(A) (2011).
214. Id. § 1001.1.
215. Lockett II, ¶ 2, 329 P.3d at 756-57.
216. Lockett v. Evans (Lockett I), 2014 OK 28, ¶ 2, 377 P.3d 1254, 1254 (Mem.).
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authority to issue such stays in criminal matters are limited to the
district courts and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. 217
This is a misinterpretation of the statute. Subsection (A) directs COCA to
set execution dates.218 Subsection (C) provides specific circumstances
under which COCA may stay an execution.219 Subsections (D), (E), and (F)
refer to stays by “any state or federal court,” but those subsections also
direct COCA to set new execution dates and direct the attorney general to
notify COCA of the dissolution or vacation of the stay. 220 Construing all the
subsections together, especially the notification provisions, indicates that
the state and federal courts referred to are courts other than COCA.
Subsection (C)’s specific limitations on COCA’s ability to issue a stay
when a challenge is pending before it would be meaningless if COCA were
free to issue stays without a challenge at all, under the more general
subsections.
The supreme court also urged COCA to be “cognizant of the time
restraints . . . [and] the gravity of the first impression constitutional
issues,” 221 but did not purport to order COCA to issue the stay. COCA
again declined to issue the stay, reasoning that the statute controlled and
that “[w]hile the Oklahoma Supreme Court has authority to deem an issue
civil and so within its jurisdiction, it does not have the power to supersede a
statute and manufacture jurisdiction in this Court for Appellants' stay
request by merely transferring it here.” 222
With the first plaintiff’s execution date only a few days away, and
COCA having denied a request for stay, the supreme court chose to grant
the stay in a 5-4 decision. 223 Although recognizing that the drafters of the
Oklahoma Constitution “never contemplated” that the supreme court would
be involved in a death penalty case, the court cited the constitution’s
access-to-courts provision as the basis for its decision to do so. 224
This case presents a very narrow question: whether these
appellants should have some access to an appellate tribunal for
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. ¶ 3, 377 P.3d at 1254 (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4).
22 OKLA. STAT. § 1001.1(A) (2011).
Id. § 1001.1(C).
Id. § 1001.1(D)-(E).
Lockett I, ¶ 4, 377 P.3d at 1254-55.
Lockett II, 2014 OK CR 3, ¶ 4, 329 P.3d 755, 758.
Lockett III, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 15, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (per curiam) (Mem.).
Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 356 P.3d at 61.
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consideration of a stay of execution based upon the consideration
of grave first impression constitutional issues regarding the
manner in which their lives will be taken. More simply, the sole
issue presented to this Court on this date is whether some court
should hear their plea for a stay and ensure their constitutional
right to access to the courts. The Oklahoma Constitution Article
2, section 6, provides: The courts of justice of the State shall be
open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every
wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation;
and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial,
delay, or prejudice. 225
The supreme court’s reliance on this access-to-courts provision was
questionable. The court previously held that this provision “was intended to
guarantee that the judiciary would be open and available for the resolution
of disputes, but not to guarantee that any particular set of events would
result in court-awarded relief.” 226 In Lockett, both plaintiffs had completed
the entire process of post-conviction remedies in state and federal courts. 227
Further, and more importantly to the stay request at issue, the plaintiffs
made no attempt to bring the issue within the jurisdiction of COCA by
filing any further application for post-conviction relief.228 Perhaps they
believed that such an application would have been unsuccessful because of
COCA’s decision on related—but not identical—claims in Malicoat v.
State, where COCA considered other Eighth Amendment challenges to the
execution procedure. 229 Thus, it would appear that the plaintiffs did have
access to the courts—both previously and in regard to the secrecy claim at
225. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 356 P.3d at 60-61.
226. Mehdipour v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrs., 2004 OK 19, ¶ 8, 90 P.3d 546, 550
(citing Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 1996 OK 6, ¶ 9, 910 P.2d 1030, 1032) (holding
that statute requiring prepayment of filing fees by prisoners who had filed three meritless
claims was constitutional).
227. Lockett II, ¶ 10, 329 P.3d at 761 (Lumpkin, J., specially concurring).
228. Id. ¶ 9, 329 P.3d at 760 (“Despite repeated invitations from this Court for
Appellants to file pleadings to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, Appellants have failed to
do so.”). Title 22, section 1089 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides for late filings for postconviction relief under certain circumstances. In Malicoat v. State, 2006 OK CR 25, ¶ 3, 137
P.3d 1234, 1235 (citation omitted), COCA considered such a filing, reasoning that “[t]his
Court has the authority to consider the merits of an issue which may so gravely offend a
defendant's constitutional rights and constitute a miscarriage of justice.”
229. Malicoat, ¶¶ 6-9, 137 P.3d at 1236-38 (rejecting challenges based on the drugs used,
the training of personnel, and the possibility of conscious pain).
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issue—although they did not receive the desired relief. If the plaintiffs
lacked access to COCA, it was because they chose to pursue their claims in
another forum. 230
The court also relied on the “rule of necessity,” 231 reasoning that because
COCA held that it lacked jurisdiction, the supreme court was required to
decide “the merits of the stay” 232 issue. This reasoning was also
questionable for several reasons. First, although the supreme court correctly
noted that under the constitution, it alone had the power to determine which
of the two courts had jurisdiction over the issue, it does not follow that
COCA “refused to exercise this Court’s order and to address the merits of
the stay.” 233 Deciding a stay request must necessarily include evaluating
compliance with statutory requirements for the stay. The court’s
determination that COCA had jurisdiction to decide the matter could not
have included authority for COCA to disregard statutes when deciding
whether to issue the stay. Yet the supreme court criticized COCA’s decision
as “not having followed the constitutional directive of this Court.” 234
Second, and relatedly, the court issued no directive to COCA. As discussed
previously, the supreme court on rare occasions has used its power to issue
writs in jurisdictional conflicts with COCA, but the court’s transfer order
contained no such writ—it merely transferred the stay issue for COCA to
consider. Finally, the applicability of the rule-of-necessity was tenuous. The
court stated that the rule “requires a judge to remain in a case regardless of
the judge's preference, if the sole power to decide a controversy resides in
that official.” 235 Reasoning that COCA “refused to exercise its rightfully
placed jurisdiction,” 236 the court invoked the access-to-courts provision as
the basis for its determination of necessity.
We can deny jurisdiction, or we can leave the appellants with no
access to the courts for resolution of their "grave" constitutional
claims. As uncomfortable as this matter makes us, we refuse to
230. See generally Andrew Spiropoulos, Strategies Leading Up to the Botched Execution
of an Oklahoma Death Row Inmate, JURIST (June 9, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://jurist.org/
forum/2014/06/andrew-spiropoulous-oklahoma-death.php (“The litigation strategy . . . was
designed to exploit the fault lines in the bifurcated system.”).
231. Lockett III, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 13, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (per curiam) (Mem.).
232. Id. ¶ 12, 356 P.3d at 61 (emphasis omitted).
233. Id. (emphasis omitted).
234. Id.
235. Id. ¶ 13, 356 P.3d at 61 (citation omitted).
236. Id.
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violate our oaths of office and to leave the appellants with no
access to the courts, their constitutionally guaranteed
measure. 237
But historically, the rule of necessity applies in cases where no judge
without some self-interest in the case is available to decide the issue
because the judge or judges with jurisdiction would otherwise be
disqualified. 238 In United States v. Will, the case cited by the court as
authority, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that the rule of
necessity is required by the duty of judges to decide cases “within their
jurisdiction.” 239 The rule has never been used where a court merely
disagrees with another court’s decision. Similar to the access-to-courts
analysis, necessity is not created by failure to achieve a certain result or
failure to comply with a court’s procedural requirements. The rule should
not be a basis for courts to expand their jurisdiction. Had the Oklahoma
Supreme Court transferred the entire case—not just the stay request—
COCA would have had an action pending before it, within its own
jurisdiction, and would have had discretion under the statute to issue a
stay. 240
The supreme court’s basis for retaining any part of the case, beginning
with the very first appeal, is unclear. The first orders merely referred to the
claims in the declaratory judgment action as civil matters. 241 In its final
opinion, 242 issued two days after the governor announced that she would
refuse to recognize the order granting the stay, 243 the court summarized its
reasoning regarding the jurisdictional issues. The court first noted that the
Declaratory Judgment Act could be used as a vehicle to find that a statute
was unconstitutional, and that the district court’s declaratory judgment that
the confidentiality provisions were unconstitutional was a final judgment. 244
Declaratory judgment actions are reviewed in the same manner as all other
237. Id.
238. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 211-17 (1980) (discussing history of rule as
authority for judges hearing and deciding cases despite grounds for disqualification).
239. Id. at 215.
240. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1001.1(C) (2011) (“When an action challenging the conviction or
sentence of death is pending before it, the Court of Criminal Appeals may stay an execution
date . . . .”)
241. Lockett III, ¶ 5, 356 P.3d at 59.
242. Lockett IV, 2014 OK 34, ¶ 2, 330 P.3d 488, 489 (per curiam).
243. Exec. Order No. 2014-08, 31 Okla. Reg. 618 (Apr. 22, 2014).
244. Lockett IV, ¶ 2, 330 P.3d at 489.
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judgments, so the court concluded that the appeal was within its appellate
jurisdiction. 245 Further, because the act provides that any court with
jurisdiction can provide further relief as “necessary and proper,” the court
reasoned that the stay was such further relief and was appropriate injunctive
relief in aid of its jurisdiction. 246
This rationale is inconsistent with the court’s prior cases. The supreme
court previously never allowed declaratory judgment actions or civil actions
for injunctive relief to be used as a way to attack penal statutes or
proceedings. For example, in Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v.
Hetherington, the court assumed original jurisdiction to dismiss a
declaratory judgment action because it “invokes the declaratory judgment
remedy to launch an impermissible collateral attack upon the judgment and
sentence in a criminal case.” 247 Preventing use of declaratory judgment
actions to construe criminal statutes is particularly important in jurisdictions
with bifurcated courts of last resort. 248
The Lockett IV court also made the following somewhat cryptic
comment regarding the jurisdictional boundary between itself and COCA:
“As concerns the scope of jurisdiction, neither the district court nor this
Court has undertaken a review of the validity or terms of the judgments and
sentences in the underlying criminal cases.” 249 This statement implies that
the secrecy provision related to neither the validity nor the terms of the
sentence. This is a narrow view of the issue in light of the court’s prior
jurisprudence. Given that the sentences at issue were for executions, issues
relating to the secrecy of the drug supplier were obviously related to

245. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 330 P.3d at 489-90 (citing 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1654 (2011)).
246. Id. ¶ 4, 330 P.3d at 490 (quoting 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1655 (2011)).
247. 1994 OK 16, ¶ 1, 868 P.2d 708, 709 (footnote omitted); see also Walters v. Okla.
Ethics Comm’n, 1987 OK 103, ¶¶ 7-8, 746 P.2d 172, 181-82 (Opala, J., concurring) (“A
civil court sitting in equity is not ordinarily concerned with the enforcement of criminal
laws; the power to interpret penal provisions is reposed solely in the courts that exercise
criminal jurisdiction. . . . The adoption of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act—which
authorized the district courts to construe the meaning, or pronounce upon the validity, of a
statute—did not change the time-honored rules that traditionally limit the power of equity to
construe penal legislation . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
248. As the Texas courts have reasoned, using declaratory judgment actions in this
manner would create “potential for conflicting decisions[] between our civil and criminal
courts of last resort on the validity of such statutes . . . . It is the prospect that civil courts
will get into the business of construing criminal statutes which represents the real danger.”
State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 948 & n.16 (Tex. 1994).
249. ¶ 5, 330 P.3d at 490.
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implementing the terms of the sentence. The mere fact that a stay of
execution was sought and considered shows that the action was criminal in
nature. Issues relating to the carrying out of sentences of execution are at
least as criminal in nature as the issues regarding application of earned
credits to sentences, supervision of probated sentences, and continuing
jurisdiction over youthful offenders, all of which the supreme court has held
are matters for COCA. Furthermore, related issues had been addressed by
COCA in Malicoat, thus counseling in favor of COCA jurisdiction,
analogous to the cases where the supreme court deferred to previous COCA
decisions construing penal statutes or statutes almost solely related to the
enforcement of penal statutes. 250
Finally, the court’s attempt to justify its decision to grant the stay by
interpreting section 1001.1, the statute that COCA relied on in denying the
stay request, was also unpersuasive.
In our second transfer order, we concluded the statute authorized
the Court of Criminal Appeals to grant this statutory remedy, but
in doing so also said that three subsections in this statute (D, E
and F) also recognize and accommodate "a stay of execution . . .
issued by any state or federal court." These subsections clearly
indicate that the statutory stay remedy in this section is not
exclusive. 251
This analysis begs the question of whether the supreme court correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case or the stay request. The fact that the
statute recognized the possibility of stays by other courts has no bearing on
whether this court—the supreme court—had the power to grant one.
In short, the Lockett saga is troubling as it relates to the jurisdictional
boundary. It marked the second time in three years that the supreme court
issued a stay in a criminal case. The court issued the stay despite its
admission that the constitution’s framers would never have contemplated
such an act. 252 Even had COCA granted the stay at the direction of the
supreme court, the supreme court still would have been involved in the
criminal case either by issuing the directive or by deciding issues
intertwined with the execution. And finally, the court issued the stay
without articulating a viable basis for classifying the case as civil, merely
250. See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
251. Lockett IV, ¶ 7, 330 P.3d at 490 (quoting Lockett I, 2014 OK 28, ¶ 3, 377 P.3d 1254,
1254 (Mem.)).
252. Lockett III, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 12, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (per curiam) (Mem.).
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making the cryptic—and inaccurate—statement about not passing on the
validity or terms of the sentence.253
3. Meyer v. Smith
Meyer v. Smith involved the timeliness of a petition seeking to disqualify
a trial judge in a criminal case. 254 Pursuant to statute 255 and its
constitutional power, 256 the supreme court promulgates rules for itself and
other courts. The rules for district courts require that a petition for
mandamus be filed within five days after the trial court denies the request to
disqualify. 257 This district court rule states that it applies to both civil and
criminal cases. But the rule does not explain how days are to be counted. In
civil cases, the rules of civil procedure apply and provide for counting of
days excluding weekends and holidays. 258 COCA, in contrast, has adopted
its own rules for criminal cases, as authorized by statute.259 Those rules
require that calendar days be used. 260 When Meyer filed his petition for writ
of mandamus seven days after the relevant district court order, COCA
dismissed the petition as untimely. 261
Meyer then sought a writ of mandamus against COCA, urging that the
supreme court direct COCA to use the business-day rule to calculate
timeliness. 262 The supreme court assumed jurisdiction, citing article 7,

253. Lockett IV, ¶ 5, 330 P.3d at 490.
254. 2015 OK 86, ¶ 1, 366 P.3d 311, 311 (Mem.).
255. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2011).
256. See sources cited infra note 274.
257. OKLA. DIST. CT. R. 15(b).
258. 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2001, 2006 (2011); see also OKLA. SUPR. CT. R. 1.3.
259. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1051(b) (2011). Actually, the statute directs COCA to provide
rules of procedure for filing an appeal and a petition for a writ of certiorari. The statute does
not address writs of mandamus or other writs. The Oklahoma Constitution, however,
provides that in addition to its appellate jurisdiction, COCA has the power to issue writs in
criminal matters. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4. As noted previously, mandamus is considered to
be in the nature of appellate jurisdiction, so COCA’s adoption of rules for mandamus is
consistent with this understanding and its constitutional powers. See supra text
accompanying note 50. In its response to Meyer v. Smith, COCA cited section 1051(b) as its
authority for its calendar-day rule. Meyer v. Engle, 2016 OK CR 1, ¶ 3, 369 P.3d 37, 38.
260. OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 1.4.
261. Order Declining to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Dismissing Petition for Writ of
Mandamus at 2, Meyer v. Engle, No. MA-2015-874 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2015).
262. Brief in Support of the Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for
Writ of Mandamus at 1-2, 4-5, Meyer v. Smith, 2015 OK 86, 366 P.3d 311 (No. 114409).
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section 4 of the constitution. 263 Presumably, the court was invoking its
superintending jurisdiction, although it did not explicitly say so. Instead of
mandamus, the court granted “[d]eclaratory relief . . . to provide for
uniform computation of the time periods” in Rule 15.264 The court
announced that “[a]ll time periods shall be computed based upon business
days whether disqualification is sought in a civil or criminal case.”265
When Meyer then filed an application with COCA seeking withdrawal of
its decision on timeliness, COCA rejected the application.266 After a brief
discussion of the jurisdictional boundary between COCA and the supreme
court, 267 the opinion listed various statutes that COCA had previously held
require calendar-day computations in criminal cases, 268 concluding that
those statutes support the consistent use of calendar days in COCA’s own
rules. 269 Three judges filed special concurrences, two of those expressing
extreme discontent with the supreme court’s involvement in the case. 270
One suggested that legislative action might be necessary to “reaffirm
[COCA’s] exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters.” 271
Legislative action is not necessary and would not be effective. The
conflict in Meyer exists not because of a conflict between statutes 272 but
because of an arguable conflict between a statute and the supreme court’s
power under the constitution. As mentioned above, section 1051 directs
263. Meyer, ¶ 1, 366 P.3d at 311.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Meyer v. Engle, 2016 OK CR 1, ¶ 17, 369 P.3d 37, 41.
267. Id. ¶ 6, 369 P.3d at 38-39.
268. Id. ¶ 11, 369 P.3d at 40.
269. Id. ¶¶ 13-17, 369 P.3d at 40-41.
270. Id. ¶ 1, 369 P.3d at 42 (Lewis, J., specially concurring) (“What troubles me the most
about this case and its history is that I am no longer surprised that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court would entertain an extraordinary writ in a criminal case.”); id. ¶ 5, 369 P.3d at 43
(Hudson, J., concurring) (“The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s actions threaten to create the
very type of conflicts and confusion in the administration of criminal justice which
Oklahoma law forbids.”).
271. Id. ¶ 3, 369 P.3d at 42 (Lewis, J., specially concurring).
272. At first blush, the rulemaking statutes may appear to be in conflict. Title 12, section
74 directs the supreme court to make and amend rules that “shall apply to the Supreme
Court . . . and all other courts of record.” However, this statutory authorization is limited to
rules “as may be required to carry into effect the provisions of this Code [of Civil
Procedure].” 12 OKLA. STAT. § 74 (2011). Thus, the statutory authorization does not conflict
with the statute authorizing COCA to make rules for appeals in criminal matters. See 22
OKLA. STAT. § 1051(b) (2011).
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COCA to create procedural rules for its cases.273 But under its constitutional
supervisory-control power or general administrative authority, 274 the
supreme court may create rules for inferior courts. And as discussed above,
COCA is inferior to the supreme court. May the supreme court create a rule
for district courts that regulates petitions for mandamus to COCA, or direct
COCA to apply a district court rule in a certain manner, despite the
legislature’s grant of rulemaking power to COCA? Is the statute granting
rulemaking power to COCA an unconstitutional intrusion on the supreme
court’s constitutional power over inferior courts?
The answer to both questions should be no. The question of whether
rulemaking power is exclusive to the courts or is jointly shared with the
legislature has been much discussed and ruled on. 275 In Oklahoma, the
supreme court has recognized that the power is shared and that “rules
promulgated by the Court must not contravene any constitutional or
statutory provision upon the same subject.” 276 And the court has conceded
that “the legislative arm of the government has the power to alter and

273. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1051(b) (2011).
274. Oklahoma cases most commonly cite article 7, section 6 of the constitution,
providing for “general administrative authority over all courts in this State” as the basis for
the supreme court’s rulemaking authority. Other states commonly cite the superintendingcontrol power as the source of rulemaking authority. See, e.g., District Court of Second
Judicial District v. McKenna, 881 P.2d 1387, 1390 (N.M. 1994) (holding that promulgating
rules that regulate procedure is inherent in the power of superintending control); see also In
re: Rules Regarding Dispute Resolution Act, 57 OKLA. B.J. 863, 876 (1986) (Kauger, J.,
specially concurring) (citing general administrative authority of section 6 and superintending
control of section 4 as authority for rulemaking); Annotation, Power of Court to Prescribe
Rules of Pleading, Practice, or Procedure, 158 A.L.R. 705 (1945); cf. McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (“Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence.”).
275. See, e.g., Mowrer v. Rusk, 618 P.2d 886, 890-91 (N.M. 1980) (“Any action of the
executive or legislative branch of the municipal government which would preclude the
Supreme Court or the district court from exercising its superintending or supervisory
authority over the municipal court violates [the state constitution]."); Charles W. Joiner &
Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55
MICH. L. REV. 623, 624 (1957) (surveying states and tracing power to King’s Bench);
Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599 (1926) (arguing that
procedural rulemaking should be solely a function of courts).
276. Eberle v. Dyer Constr. Co., 1979 OK 49, ¶ 27, 598 P.2d 1189, 1193 (first citing
Carlile v. Nat’l Oil & Dev. Co., 1921 OK 163, 201 P. 377; and then Pierce v. State, 1963
OK CR 58, 383 P.2d 699).
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regulate the procedure in both law and equity matters.” 277 Only where the
legislature’s action has so intruded on the power of the courts as to violate
separation-of-powers principles has the supreme court held a statute
unconstitutional.278 For example, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
v. Long, the court held unconstitutional a statute requiring courts to hear
certain types of cases within ten days of the defendant’s answer.279 The
court reasoned that such a requirement stripped so much discretion from the
courts as to interfere with the courts’ ability to safeguard the rights of
litigants. 280 In In re Bledsoe, the court held that the legislature could not
eliminate bar passage as a requirement for bar admission, because it was an
intrusion on the court’s inherent power to decide who should be admitted to
practice. 281 And in Puckett v. Cook, the court held that a statute prohibiting
consolidation of cases for trial was an “unconstitutional abridgement” of the
courts’ power to exercise judicial discretion.282
The statute granting rulemaking authority to COCA is not analogous to
the statutes involved in these cases. First, no separation-of-powers issue
arises. The legislature has delegated power to the judiciary, just not to the
supreme court. Second, the statute is consistent with the constitution and its
bifurcation of appellate jurisdiction. Logic and efficiency support a power
in each court to create its own rules for appeals within its jurisdiction.
Especially considering that a statute is to be considered constitutional if
possible, 283 the statute giving COCA rulemaking powers easily passes
muster. Further, were the supreme court to make a rule purporting to
supersede the COCA rule, any such rule would contravene the statute
giving rulemaking power to COCA, which the supreme court admits it is
prohibited from doing. 284 And finally, even if despite this reasoning, the
supreme court considered the grant of rulemaking power to COCA to be an
277. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Long, 1926 OK 963, ¶ 16, 251 P. 486, 489.
278. See, e.g., Puckett v. Cook, 1978 OK 108, ¶ 13, 586 P.2d 721, 723 (“Where the
legislature acts with regard to a matter over which courts have ultimate authority, and acts in
a way to deprive courts of that authority, the legislative act is an unconstitutional
abridgement of the principle of separation of powers.”).
279. ¶ 20, 251 P. at 489.
280. Id. ¶ 16, 251 P. at 489.
281. 1939 OK 506, ¶ 0, 97 P.2d 556, 556.
282. ¶ 5, 586 P.2d at 722.
283. Naylor v. Petuskey, 1992 OK 88, n.2, 834 P.2d 439, 440 n.2 (“[T]here is a
presumption that an act of the legislature is constitutional. Acts of the legislature will be
construed in harmony with the constitution.” (citation omitted)).
284. Eberle v. Dyer Constr. Co., 1979 OK 49, ¶ 27, 598 P.2d 1189, 1193.
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unconstitutional intrusion on its superintending-power jurisdiction, the
court should remember that superintending power is a discretionary
power. 285 Uniformity of filing deadlines is a worthy principle. But in view
of Oklahoma’s system of bifurcated appellate jurisdiction and the need for
comity and clarity of jurisdictional boundaries, use of the superintending
power to usurp COCA’s procedural rules seems to be a poor exercise of
discretion.
After the COCA opinion in Meyer v. Engle, the petitioner was left in
limbo. The supreme court’s order lacked a writ of mandamus ordering
COCA to allow the petitioner to file his petition. 286 Instead, the court’s
order announced a grant of “declaratory relief” that time periods should be
based on business days in both civil and criminal proceedings to disqualify
a trial judge. 287 COCA considered the order “a request for comity,” which it
declined to grant. 288 After the petitioner requested direction from the
supreme court, the court wrote that—because it had already ruled—it
“deem[ed] no further action need be taken,” citing article 7, section 4 of the
constitution. 289
This is an odd state of affairs. The supreme court knows that COCA
declined to act in accordance with the supreme court’s decision, so the
court should take some action either to enforce or withdraw its order. First,
the supreme court could use its superintending power to order COCA to
change its rule. As discussed above, this would not be a good use of the
superintending power. The power should be used sparingly, and its use here
would conflict with the statute directing COCA to make procedural rules.
The second obvious course of action is for the supreme court to
withdraw its order granting declaratory relief. This is effectively the result
anyway, because COCA ignored the order, and the petitioner’s criminal
case is proceeding before the judge that the petitioner sought to
disqualify—without the petition for mandamus ever being considered by
COCA. If the supreme court had withdrawn its order, at least the rule would
be clear for the petitioner and other parties who may become similarly
situated.
Instead, the third choice of doing nothing, as the supreme court has
chosen, leaves the rule in a state of ambiguity. The declaratory relief is of
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

E.g., Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 27, 353 P.3d 532, 545-46.
Meyer v. Engle, 2016 OK CR 1, ¶ 15, 369 P.3d 37, 41.
Id.
Id.
Order, Meyer v. Smith, 2015 OK 86, 366 P.3d 311 (Feb. 29, 2016) (No. 114,409).
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no benefit to the petitioner, unless he is convicted and somehow convinces
the supreme court to become involved in his appeal, based on COCA’s
failure to consider his petition for mandamus. This seems unlikely, because
if the supreme court were going to press the issue, the time to do that would
be before the trial, not after. Allowing a trial before the judge in question,
and then attempting to intervene afterwards, would be a waste of resources
for all parties and courts. It would also put the supreme court in a position it
has never been—becoming involved with the merits of a conviction. So the
result is an order whose only effect is to create ambiguity for future
petitioners.
III. Conclusion
Unlike the Texas court structure of coequal courts of last resort 290—
which a Texas Supreme Court justice recently described as a “Rube
Goldberg-designed judicial ‘system’” 291—the Oklahoma Constitution
provides that the Oklahoma Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the
jurisdictional boundary between itself and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals. One would think this provision would be a safeguard against
lingering jurisdictional disputes between the two courts, and for the most
part, this has been true. In some instances—such as the allocation of
jurisdiction over grand jury proceedings—the lack of conflict is because the
courts have worked well together, taking care to provide a clear boundary
and consistency between criminal and civil issues. In other instances, the
lack of conflict is because the courts have been extremely deferential to
each other, even to the extent of ceding jurisdiction over issues arguably
within their own realms. And even the most recent conflicts should not be
overstated. Although three times 292 in the last five years, the courts have
290. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 5.
291. In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 378 (Tex. 2011) (Willett, J., dissenting).
292. A fourth case, Allen v. State, 2011 OK CR 31, 265 P.3d 754, resulted in somewhat
competing orders but to a lesser extent than the three cases discussed. In Allen, another
execution case, the defendant attempted to appeal a jury’s determination of his sanity to be
executed. Id. ¶ 2, 265 P.3d at 755. The supreme court initially assumed jurisdiction over the
appeal but reversed itself a year later and transferred the case to COCA. Id. ¶ 2, 265 P.3d at
755-56. The supreme court’s order stated that the case was transferred to COCA for “a
constitutionally acceptable substantial and procedural review of the jury’s verdict.” Id. ¶ 4,
265 P.3d at 756. The defendant argued that this order required COCA to conduct such a
review. Id. COCA declined, holding that Oklahoma statutes provided for no appeal from the
jury’s sanity determination and that no review was constitutionally required. Id. ¶ 13, 265
P.3d at 757.
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issued orders that compete to some extent, the supreme court ultimately
declined to assume jurisdiction in one of those—Leftwich—after
considering briefs and oral argument.
Yet the supreme court issued a stay in the criminal case in Leftwich—a
clear crossing of the boundary. 293 The most troubling case, of course, was
Lockett, not only because it was a death penalty case where stakes are
highest, but also because the publicity surrounding the dueling orders and
the governor’s announcement that the supreme court had exceeded its
constitutional authority tends to undermine the public’s confidence in the
court system. 294 And the publicity continues regarding the latest conflict in
Meyer, including a reminder of the courts’ disputes in the previous two
cases. 295 For that reason alone, the supreme court would be wise to
recognize a brighter civil-criminal line and articulate specific reasons for
crossing it. Instead, the court has used a case-by-case approach, which it
admits has weaknesses:
This “case-by-case” approach necessarily results in an evolving
understanding of the appropriate line of demarcation between the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction and that of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. The results can be confusing when a more recent
decision is viewed against the backdrop of older, factually
similar cases reaching the opposite conclusion on the
jurisdictional issue. We acknowledge that confusion, but
conclude that a hard-and-fast rule would not serve the ends of
justice. 296
The court’s recent opinion in Dutton v. Midwest City purported to
categorize the types of cases where the supreme court has exercised
jurisdiction when criminal matters are involved. 297 But the opinion lacked
clarity for those seeking guidance regarding future cases. For example, in
the “Original Supervisory Civil Jurisdiction” section, one of the categories
was “other various circumstances where civil jurisdiction exists in this
293. See Leftwich I, 2011 OK 80, ¶ 4, 262 P.3d 750, 750-51.
294. See generally Lockett IV, 2014 OK 34, 330 P.3d 488 (per curiam).
295. Nolan Clay, Oklahoma’s Top Courts’ Judges Squabble Over Duties, OKLAHOMAN
(Feb. 1, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://newsok.com/article/5475962.
296. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 7
n.1, 184 P.3d 546, 548 n.1 (citations omitted).
297. 2015 OK 51, 353 P.3d 532 (holding on various grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate an appeal from a criminal conviction in municipal court).
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Court, although its exercise may involve a criminal proceeding.” 298 This
vague category included the appearance bond cases299 and a proceeding to
oust a public official. 300 Thus, the opinion categorized prior decisions but
did not always offer a cogent rationale for why those decisions had been
reached. Similarly, in its discussion of the civil-criminal distinction, the
court cited Mahler for the proposition that punishment is an essential part of
a criminal case.301 The court followed that with a cite to Lockett IV, using
the signal “cf.” with the quote indicating that the court had refrained from
reviewing the validity or terms of the sentence in Lockett IV. 302 As
previously discussed, this distinction is puzzling, at best.
Two statements from Dutton come close to defining the civil-criminal
boundary. First, the court reasoned that “if a petitioner’s claim is of such a
nature that it is normally reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in a
properly filed proceeding in that Court such as a direct appeal or postconviction appeal, then the Oklahoma Supreme Court will not assume
jurisdiction on that claim.” 303 This kind of circular definition may have
predictive value in some cases but is not useful in less clear cases, and it
offers no basis for analysis in a close case of first impression. The other
possibly definitional statement in Dutton was in its explanation of Lynch,
the case where the court decided the constitutionality of compensation for
attorneys representing criminal defendants. The court stated that its decision
did “not include an adjudication of the elements of a defendant’s criminal
offense, defenses, and personal rights a defendant possesses in his or her
criminal proceeding as they relate to the criminal cause of action, judgment,
or sentence,” implying that only an adjudication of one of those items
would qualify as a criminal case that would be within COCA’s jurisdiction
under the constitution.304 This description is certainly more predictive of

298. Id. ¶ 20, 353 P.3d at 541.
299. E.g., Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193; see supra notes 64-70 and
accompanying text.
300. Hale v. Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs, 1979 OK 158, 603 P.2d 761; see supra note 139.
Hale was not really a criminal proceeding at all—the statute merely required the ouster to be
conducted as one. But no criminal punishment was involved.
301. Dutton, ¶ 21 n.24, 353 P.3d at 541 n.24.
302. Id.
303. Id. ¶ 21, 353 P.3d at 541 (emphasis omitted).
304. Id. ¶ 23, 353 P.3d at 543. The court made a similar statement regarding Sanders v.
Followell, the case of statutory interpretation of the attorney-fee statute. “The controversy
adjudicated by this Court did not involve a part of the criminal cause of action, defenses
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whether the supreme court would consider an issue civil or criminal. But its
restrictive wording seems more focused on particular issues rather than
whether the issue arose in a criminal case, as the constitution specifies.
Further, applying the description to Lockett indicates that the court should
have considered the case to be criminal. The secrecy of the supplier of
drugs used in the execution seems clearly to be an issue regarding personal
rights possessed by a defendant in his criminal proceeding, relating to his
sentence. 305 Similarly, applying the wording to the issue in Leftwich
supports the concurring opinion of the sole supreme court justice who
wanted to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Application of the speech or
debate clause obviously related to a defense in the criminal proceeding.
Comparatively, although the Texas courts have also struggled with
jurisdictional issues caused by bifurcation, they have articulated some broad
principles to define the boundary. In Texas, the constitution’s jurisdictional
language is not consistent for the two courts. The Texas Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction over “all cases except in criminal law matters,” 306
whereas the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has appellate jurisdiction “in
all criminal cases.” 307 But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has writ
jurisdiction “in criminal law matters.”308 The difference in language—
“matters” versus “cases”—and the varying constitutional language defining
the Texas Supreme Court’s jurisdiction throughout the years 309 have
resulted in interpretation of both terms. Although the courts have never
specifically defined a “criminal case,” or a “criminal law matter,” they have
adopted principles that, for the most part, result in broader jurisdiction for
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals compared to the jurisdiction of
COCA. For example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that an
appeal from a post-conviction denial of a motion for DNA testing was a
“criminal case” because it was “closely connected to, and could affect, a

thereto, or issues relating to the propriety or enforcement of a sentence upon a criminal
judgment.” Id.
305. The same result is reached using the court’s alternate formulation of “issues relating
to the . . . enforcement of a sentence upon a criminal judgment.” Id. ¶ 23, 353 P.3d at 543.
The secrecy of the drug supplier relates to the enforcement of the sentence of execution.
306. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a).
307. Id. art. V, § 5(a).
308. Id. art. V, § 5(c).
309. Section 3 originally limited the supreme court’s jurisdiction to “civil cases.” Id. art.
V, § 3 (amended 1981).
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conviction and sentence . . . in a criminal case.”310 The court relied on
language in Texas Supreme Court precedent holding that bond forfeiture
appeals are criminal cases.311 Regarding “criminal law matters,” the court
has stated that “[i]n our view, average voters reading the phrase ‘criminal
law matters’ at the time of its adoption would probably have interpreted it
to encompass, at a minimum, all legal issues arising directly out of a
criminal prosecution.” 312 “Disputes which arise over the enforcement of
statutes governed by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and which
arise as a result of or incident to a criminal prosecution, are criminal law
matters.” 313
No definition could provide an easy answer to every issue that might
arise, but these broad principles are in line with what the public and most
attorneys would consider to describe a criminal case or a criminal law
matter, as opposed to a civil case or matter. For example, applying these
principles to Lockett would clearly define the issue regarding secrecy of the
drug supplier as criminal. The issue was “closely connected to, and could
affect” the sentence of execution in the criminal case. 314 The execution
statutes at issue are part of the Criminal Procedure title, and the issue

310. Kutzner v. State, 75 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Another of the
court’s statements was not as helpful, though: “[T]his Court will entertain an appeal
when . . . it is related to the ‘standard definition’ of a criminal case.” Id. at 431 (quoting
Bradley v. Miller, 458 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970)).
311. E.g., Jeter v. State, 26 S.W. 49, 49-50 (Tex. 1894).
312. Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993) (assigning a judge to a criminal case was a criminal law matter).
313. Curry v. Wilson, 853 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding a dispute
regarding collection from defendant of costs for appointed counsel in capital case was
criminal law matter). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has sometimes interpreted
“criminal law matter” even more broadly. For example, the court has stated that “[a]n issue
does not cease to be a criminal law matter merely because elements of civil law must be
addressed to resolve the issue.” Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 765 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (holding a dispute regarding sufficiency of evidence for clerk’s bill of costs in
criminal case was a criminal law matter); see also State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court
of Appeals for Third District, 885 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“Although civil
and criminal law matters may occasionally overlap, when a matter is essentially criminal, the
presence of civil law issues will not remove the matter from our jurisdiction.”), abrogated in
part on other grounds by Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996);
Smith v. Flack 728 S.W.2d 784, 788-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (“[E]nforcement of an order
issued pursuant to a criminal statute is a criminal law matter as much as the issuance of the
order itself, even if it requires this Court to examine civil laws in the process.”).
314. Kutzner, 75 S.W.3d at 429.
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certainly arose “as a result of” a criminal prosecution. 315 Furthermore, these
principles seem to create no more jurisdictional conflicts than the
Oklahoma system—just differing results—as indicated by the difference in
jurisdiction of the appearance bond forfeiture cases. 316 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals was created for the same purpose as COCA—docket
relief—and these principles are consistent with that purpose. 317 Going
forward, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should articulate similar broad
principles that would be more predictive of future outcomes, be consistent
with the purpose of COCA’s creation, and be consistent with the common
meaning of a “criminal case.”
Finally, a fair question is whether the disadvantages of this bifurcated
court system outweigh its advantages, and whether bifurcation at the
highest level serves any purpose. 318 Although outside the scope of this
315. In Texas, the Court of Criminal Appeals has reasoned that “[c]learly, the entry of an
order which stays the execution of a death row inmate is a criminal law matter.” Holmes,
885 S.W.2d at 394.
316. Similarly, attorney fee matters in criminal cases are criminal law matters. Weiner v.
Dial, 653 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (“The provision for appointment and
compensation of attorneys to represent indigents in criminal law matters is certainly itself a
criminal law matter.”). However, there is authority holding that, unlike Oklahoma’s
decisions, appeals of jury determinations of sanity are not criminal law matters. See Torres
v. State, 403 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966); Hardin v. State, 248 S.W.2d 487, 487
(Tex. Crim. App. 1952). But these cases have been criticized for conflating the appealability
of the determination with whether it was criminal or civil. See Kutzner, 75 S.W.3d at 43031; GEORGE E. DIX & JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 57.2 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated November 2015).
317. William L. Willis, The Evolution of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 29 TEX.
B.J. 723, 723 (1966). But see Ben L. Mesches, Bifurcated Appellate Review: The Texas
Story of Two High Courts, JUDGES J., Fall 2014, at 30 (citing Scott Henson, Caveats to
Debate on Merging Texas Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, GRITS FOR
BREAKFAST (Dec. 13, 2012), http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/search?q=Caveats+to
+debate (arguing that the court was created to “facilitate the use of criminal law” to enforce
Jim Crow policies)).
318. See generally 1 STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1990) (“Where the volume of appeals is such that the state’s highest court cannot
satisfactorily perform these functions, a system of intermediate appellate courts should be
organized. . . . The supreme court, or highest appellate court, should have authority to review
all justiciable controversies and proceedings, regardless of subject matter or amount
involved.”). The commentary following the standard notes that appellate courts are
considered to perform two basic functions: error correction and law development. The
theory behind a court structure with an intermediate appellate court—as Oklahoma has on
the civil side—is that the workload is distributed so that each court may focus on its role.
The intermediate appellate court focuses on correcting errors by the trial courts, primarily for
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article, subject-matter judicial specialization has been criticized on
numerous grounds in addition to boundary problems. 319 In fact, criminal
law has been singled out as a particularly inappropriate subject matter for a
specialized court. 320 And Oklahoma’s system creates a possibility of
divergent views on issues that could arise in both courts. Comity between
the courts has avoided that result so far, with Leftwich being the closest
call. 321
the benefit of the appellant. The highest court focuses on the law development function—
resolving issues for the community at large. No intermediate court exists on the criminal side
in Oklahoma, so COCA performs both functions.
319. See generally Posner, supra note 9. In addition to boundary problems, three of
Posner’s arguments against specialization would be relevant to COCA: (1) Insularity—the
court is cut off from divergent perspectives or broader views that might be provided by nonspecialists, and non-specialists likely do not pay close attention to its decisions; (2)
Inferiority—the focus solely on criminal issues makes the work repetitive, and it may be
considered less prestigious than the supreme court; (3) Expertise—the argument is that
specialized knowledge is not significantly valuable, because judging requires decisionmaking expertise rather than subject-matter expertise. Posner also argues that specialized
courts exacerbate the danger of one ideological view dominating the court, giving a specific
example of a division in “criminal law between those who emphasize public safety and those
who emphasize defendants’ rights.” Id. at 783; see also Oldfather, supra note 9. The author
provides a collection of sources discussing judicial specialization, id. at 849 n.9, and
considers research into the psychology of expertise. Within discussion of the potential
inferiority of specialists, Oldfather identifies another potential argument against
specialization: desensitization. The argument is that “specialized judges will come to view a
greater fraction of the cases before them as routine . . . . [and thus] engage less deeply.” Id.
at 860. In contrast, the arguments in favor of judicial specialization are primarily that the
expertise of specialists leads to better results and efficiency. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 378 (“If, as common experience suggests,
experts are better than laymen at dealing with matters in their special areas, the specialized
judiciary should handle cases more efficiently . . . . Most important, the court’s expertise
should enable it to craft better opinions . . . .”).
320. Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
634, 638-39 (1973) (“[W]hile I am not at all opposed to specialized courts in principle,
criminal law seems to me the last place for them. The main arguments for specialized courts
are the need for expertise and for prompt and authoritative determination of the law so that
people can formulate their conduct accordingly. . . . Neither argument applies to criminal
law. Its concepts are readily within reach of any competent lawyer, even though, as has been
the case with many federal judges, he has had little or no criminal practice. Furthermore,
criminals do not plan their activity with an eye fixed on the . . . Penal Code. . . . Moreover, I
see actual detriments in a specialized court of criminal appeals. It is too likely to become
dominated by hard-liners or soft-liners, more likely the former.” (footnote omitted))
321. See Leftwich I, 2011 OK 80, 262 P.3d 750. Divergent views appear to exist
regarding the scope of protection against search and seizure, but no conflicting decisions on
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But regardless of these potential criticisms, the Oklahoma court structure
is well entrenched and unlikely to change, 322 so the jurisdictional boundary
should be respected. All three of the supreme court’s recent incursions were
inconsistent with precedent and ultimately fruitless. In none of the three did
the supreme court’s involvement change the result that would have
occurred had the court held that it lacked jurisdiction. So a greater
acceptance by the supreme court of COCA’s exclusivity, and a better
articulation of principles to define the boundary, would serve the system
well.

a single set of facts appear to exist. Compare Turner v. City of Lawton, 1986 OK 51, ¶ 15,
733 P.2d 375, 380 (“The Oklahoma Constitutional prohibition is broader in scope than its
federal counterpart, forbidding any unreasonable search or seizure and requiring that the
place to be searched be described with greater particularity than does the federal
constitution.”), with State v. Sittingdown, 2010 OK CR 22, ¶ 17, 240 P.3d 714, 718 (“[T]he
Federal Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution are the same in the rights protected.”).
322. Unlike the Texas system, Oklahoma’s bifurcated system has not been the subject of
critical commentary. Reform efforts periodically arise in Texas. See, e.g., Mesches, supra
note 317; Thomas M. Reavley, Court Improvement: The Texas Scene, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
269 (1973).
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